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It can resemble a game of chess. Move one piece here, the opponent reacts. They then follow.
Fundamentally, occupying different squares on a chessboard — in Aston Villa’s case, spaces on the pitch — makes the opponent react.
Villa’s No 10s are carefully designed constructs of Unai Emery. Invariably, there are at least two of them in every starting XI — occasionally Emery will play three — with the player disguised as the left-winger actually a second No 10. The purpose of Villa’s deep build-up is to coax opponents into pressing or, as in chess, move into positions Emery wants them, opening passing lanes into his attacking midfielders.
It is a prodding, coaxing ploy that is seamless when passing and movements are precise, but can be precarious, especially with misplaced passes often falling centrally. Since Emery’s arrival in October 2022, no Premier League outfit attacks through the middle more.
“They always play like this,” Bournemouth head coach Andoni Iraola told reporters in 2024. “Everyone knows what they are going to do, but it’s difficult to defend because of their timing and the way they turn their players in the middle.”
Emery’s counterparts have attempted varying strategies to nullify his No 10s, such as crowding central areas or man-to-man marking.
Burnley’s visit was one of the more straightforward to assume, given they averaged the lowest possession of any top-flight side so far this season (33 per cent) and operated in a back five. They aimed to stifle space for Villa’s No 10s and, like others that had recently come before, had a specific plan.
Right centre-back Josh Laurent would follow Morgan Rogers wherever he went. This was equally an indication of Rogers’ threat in the view of head coach Scott Parker and how influential Emery’s attacking midfielders are.
Emery was aware of this and intelligently picked Donyell Malen from the start, playing alongside Ollie Watkins as a strike pairing. Simply through Burnley’s engrossment with Rogers, Villa had a two-vs-two on the other two centre-backs. This culminated in Malen’s first goal, with Boubacar Kamara playing an exceptional through ball into the Netherlands international’s path, having peeled off Burnley centre-back Maxime Esteve.
Burnley were another team that recognised Villa’s threat centrally.
Different teams have different strategies to negate. Take Everton, an inherently conservative out-of-possession team. David Moyes wanted his midfield pair of Tim Iroegbunam and Idrissa Gueye to block passing lanes into Villa’s attacking duo.
The issue with this, however, was that Villa still had a four-vs-two centrally through their own midfield pairing, allowing time on the ball for John McGinn and Lamare Bogarde. More pertinently, if Iroegbunam or Gueye tired or did not screen passes correctly (shown below), Rogers and Emiliano Buendia had huge spaces to receive and turn, owing to Everton’s deep centre-backs refusing to step out.
Demonstrated in the season’s early knocks, Villa’s No 10s are still impacting a match even if they do not do a great deal. This is because opponents are constantly mindful of their positions. As Rogers’ rocky form will testify, Villa’s attacking struggles have not been through a lack of service, but rather the profligacy in possession.
Before Burnley, Rogers had received more progressive passes than any other Villa player (measured by a pass moving 10 or more yards upfield), as well as attempting the most through balls. When those present wrinkles are ironed out, Rogers is integral to chance creation.
Since the start of April — and having registered another assist for Malen’s second goal in the 2-1 victory over Burnley — Rogers has recorded the most assists in the Premier League (eight). Only three Villa players in Premier League history have registered more open-play assists than the 23-year-old over a calendar year.
In Rotterdam, Feyenoord were vulnerable to Villa cutting through midfield. Head coach Robin van Persie’s pressing scheme was to show Villa’s defenders down the line, with Feyenoord’s closest central midfielder pressing the ball-side No 10.
This is not particularly unusual, and in a traditional 4-2-3-1 system, forcing a team down one side is effective. However, Villa had a second attacking midfielder who was standing in a passing lane — provided Villa could pass out from the first phase of pressure. This player, furthest away from the ball, was spare. Emery wanted to create those scenarios as much as he could, instructing his two deep midfielders to stay close together. This avoided passing lanes into the No 10s from being blocked.
Feyenoord remained indecisive as to whose job it was to press the furthest No 10. Here, with attention being paid to Rogers, Buendia was left unmarked.
Feyenoord’s central midfielders did not know whether to stick or twist. Luciano Valente pressed high onto McGinn, leaving midfield partner Hwang In-beom covering both No 10s. In the example below, Hwang In-beom anticipated Kamara’s pass but was not close enough to intercept.
This allowed Buendia to play around the corner to Rogers, taking Hwang In-beom out of the game. With centre-back Anel Ahmedhodzic a distance away, the No 10s’ positioning meant Villa could cut through centrally.
This precise move happened repeatedly. Hwang In-beom would be left on his own, with Kamara passing into Buendia or Rogers.
With Feyenoord’s defenders unsure whether to engage, Rogers had time and space to drive.
Villa’s incision through the lines is enhanced when Pau Torres plays. The type of pass required to break Feyenoord’s press — a whipped, diagonal pass into the distant No 10 — was identified early in the game by the Spain international.
When Torres looked up to play the pass, Feyenoord midfielder Sem Steijn had recognised the danger, but was caught too far upfield to intercept.
Four days earlier, Fulham adopted a contrasting ploy. They would press when the situation allowed, with Marco Silva wanting to restrict Rogers’ space to turn. This, though, did not apply to the second No 10, which was Harvey Elliott in the first half. Instead, Sander Berge was tasked with marking both Elliott and McGinn.
Below, McGinn noticed he was the spare player, with Berge deciding to stay with Elliott.
Berge did not have the support of centre-back Calvin Bassey behind him to step on Elliott when pressing McGinn. This left Villa with an overload down that side of the pitch.
Alternatively, if an opponent aggressively presses both No 10s — as Laurent did with Rogers and Bologna attempted a fortnight earlier — Villa will create a two-vs-two up top. Malen was the key beneficiary of this against Burnley.
Emery became the quickest Villa manager to 80 wins on Sunday, and with 15 matches to spare. Several ingredients have contributed to such prolonged consistency, yet Villa’s attacking prowess has been underpinned by Emery’s use of his chess piece No 10s.
