FFP

[Chris Harte]

We spent the second most on agent fees between Feb '25 to Feb '26. How do I become one? I know contract renewals count towards this but bloody hell.

Anyone know how many players have renewed contracts in that time period?

[Percy McCarthy]

Here’s the thing on X I was referring to earlier (posted by AVFC Statto):

💰 #AVFC owners Nassef Sawiris and Wes Edens have injected £47 million into the club in the last month alone.

— 21 Feb 2026 — £25 million raised (filed 4 March)
— 23 Mar 2026 — £22 million raised (filed 31 March)

The total share count has grown from 763,177,439 (after the February raise) to 785,177,439 (after the March raise).

All shares were fully paid in cash, with nothing unpaid.

[Percy McCarthy]

Also from X, somebody’s interpretation of what this equity means, and what it does:

“Inside Aston Villa’s £22m cash injection: quiet reinforcement, not reckless acceleration

There are moments in a football club’s financial life that arrive with noise — takeover bids, marquee signings, debt restructures dressed up as ambition.
And then there are moments like this.

On March 31, a filing quietly landed at Companies House confirming that Aston Villa Football Club Limited had issued 22 million new shares at £1 each. No fanfare. No announcement. No statement from the club.

Just £22 million, wired in. A familiar ownership, a deliberate move. The context matters. Villa remain controlled by Wes Edens, Nassef Sawiris, Atairos.

Their stakes — roughly 34.46%, 34.46% and 31.08% — are unchanged. There is no dilution event here, no new investor entering.

Instead, this is ownership doubling down. Not with rhetoric, but with equity. Why equity — and why now? £22m is modest by Premier League standards, but the method matters. This is not debt. It is cash injected directly into the club’s balance sheet.

Under tightening financial controls — particularly squad cost ratio rules — clubs are constrained by the relationship between revenue and spending. Equity injections absorb losses without adding debt, support compliance and improve cash flow.

Villa, under Unai Emery, have been investing heavily to sustain European-level performance. This £22m supports that trajectory.

The V Sports structure beneath it all

Villa operate within V Sports, a Luxembourg-based multi-club group also holding stakes in Vitória SC and Real Unión.

The model enables centralised control, shared strategy & player pathways but also includes a secured debt facility arranged by Goldman Sachs, with key assets linked. Choosing equity over further borrowing suggests discipline.

Growth without gambling

Villa’s rise under Sawiris and Edens has been ambitious but controlled. This move reinforces that approach, strengthening finances, preserving regulatory headroom and supporting continued growth.

Rather than chasing progress through leverage, the owners are reinforcing the base.

This is not £22m for transfers. It protects spending capacity within rules, reduces pressure for forced sales & maintains flexibility. But limits remain — Villa still need smart trading and wage control.

A £22m share issue is easy to overlook. In context, it signals a clear strategy: Sustained ambition, backed by ownership — not risk. When action is needed, Villa’s owners act quietly, but decisively.”

Note: who posted this was obviously not aware that, in fact, £47m was injected, but the same principles apply.

Those who know this stuff better than I are free to point out it’s a load of old bollocks, if indeed it is.

[tomd2103]

Surely at some point in a Bosman type of case a club or group of clubs will challenge this. The rules are so heavily skewed in favour of the established financial few and clearly restrict growth from challengers. It’s so prohibitive that revenues receive the greatest weight to financial fairness. Losses, debt seemingly much less relevant. The rules ensure chasing teams in all the major leagues never catch the elite clubs. It’s helped UEFA stop a breakaway league which seems a big part of what the rules are as they are.

Not going to happen in PL - nothing changes without 14 votes and there is no way on earth that the likes of  Fulham, Palace, Bournemouth have any ambition to be anything other than money makers….they do everything the cartel clubs want them to and will always fall into line like obedient lemmings.

Yep, simply being in the Premier League is enough for a number of clubs. 

[Percy McCarthy]

The £47m that’s been injected in the form of new equity looks suspiciously close to the €60m that could, under UEFA rules, trigger a bit more freedom to spend this summer.

Edit: at today’s rates, it’s €53.93m.

[eye digress]

First-rate sleuthing.

[PeterWithe]

The £47m that’s been injected in the form of new equity looks suspiciously close to the €60m that could, under UEFA rules, trigger a bit more freedom to spend this summer.

Edit: at today’s rates, it’s €53.93m.

I am happily almost completely ignorant of this finance stuff but, isn’t it the case that the owners have always had the wealth to make these kinds of injections, but if this £60m is not ‘earned’ in revenue through the club’s commercial endeavours, it doesn’t count?

[Stu]

Seems like good news! I only wish they’d do a share issue for fans to potentially buy.

[PaulWinch again]

The £47m that’s been injected in the form of new equity looks suspiciously close to the €60m that could, under UEFA rules, trigger a bit more freedom to spend this summer.

Edit: at today’s rates, it’s €53.93m.

I am happily almost completely ignorant of this finance stuff but, isn’t it the case that the owners have always had the wealth to make these kinds of injections, but if this £60m is not ‘earned’ in revenue through the club’s commercial endeavours, it doesn’t count?

Yeah I can’t quite reconcile that - but I could entirely be missing some nuance.

[Percy McCarthy]

The £47m that’s been injected in the form of new equity looks suspiciously close to the €60m that could, under UEFA rules, trigger a bit more freedom to spend this summer.

Edit: at today’s rates, it’s €53.93m.

I am happily almost completely ignorant of this finance stuff but, isn’t it the case that the owners have always had the wealth to make these kinds of injections, but if this £60m is not ‘earned’ in revenue through the club’s commercial endeavours, it doesn’t count?

One of the rules I’ve read (on here, quite recently I think) is that under our settlement, we are only allowed to have a negative transfer balance of €5m. However, I think the settlement states that this can be extended to €60m if it is matched by equity.

Forgive me if I’ve got this wrong - I haven’t taken notes so my assumptions are from memory and I’ve been up all bastard night.

Could do with that Adam bloke off YouTube doing an explainer video.

[paul_e]

I think that's right, I remember reading the same.

[lovejoy]

The share issue may well give some headroom in net transfer spend as detailed above. The main thrust of the long X post was that this is equity not debt so it helps our profit as the equity has no interest attached unlike debt. Clearly it provides helpful cashflow for acquisitions. However it can do nothing to help us under the FSR rules which limit wages/amortisation of transfer fees and a % of revenue which is set at 70% in Europe.

[Ads]

Apparently our FER limit is €5m but can be increased to €60m with equity.

Which if I am understanding correctly (and that is a doubt) we would need to generate €66m in sales to get to the €60m threshold of permissible losses or €210m in sales to get to €5m, as your sales are only counted in thirds I believe.

We should just rip the fucking shit out these ****** and sue them into oblivion. Fucking unfair cartel bollocks is anti-EU law.

This is the FER business I mentioned yesterday. We have to put the equity in or sell absolutely everybody to comply given we have an £82m loss and only 33% of a sale counts.

Plus I don't think our non-A Squad sales count. Its an utterly catastrophic set of nonsense designed to keep Franco's mob and all their European cronies where they are, less another upstart like PSG or Man City crash the party.

[SaddVillan]

A gloomy piece from The Athletic explaining how, despite making a profit this year, we're still being screwed by PSR, SCR and UEFA.

ASTON VILLA ACCOUNTS: £17m PROFIT MASKS DEEPER LOSSES AND ONGOING EUROPEAN CONCERN

Last September, The Athletic projected that Aston Villa would breach UEFA rules once again.

Forecasts indicated the club’s squad cost ratio (SCR) — the percentage of overall turnover spent on football-related salaries — was notably lower than the 80 per cent mark it exceeded in 2024, yet it was crucially still above the 70 per cent limit set by European football’s governing body

Their attempt to reduce their SCR to 70 per cent was a fundamental reason behind Villa’s lack of significant spending last summer, with their gross outlay the lowest in the Premier League.

Villa and Chelsea were fined €11million (£9.6m) and €31m respectively after the 2024 breaches, with sanctions proportionate to the size of excess. Chelsea and Villa later sold their women’s teams to the clubs’ respective parent holding companies — Chelsea to Blueco in May, and Villa to V Sports.

From the €11m fine, €6m of that was attributed to breaching SCR, while the remaining €5m was due to breaking UEFA’s football earnings rule (FER), which is the governing body’s version of profit and sustainability rules (PSR). FER states that a club in its competitions can only incur losses of up to €60m (£52m) over three years. That can increase by €10m per season if teams meet certain sustainability criteria, but English clubs, carrying significant transfer debts, tend not to.

This has tightened the financial millstone long tied to Villa’s neck, having posted a £120.3m pre-tax loss in the 2022-23 season, an £85.9m deficit in 2023-24, and most recently, as explained by The Athletic last month, an £82m pre-tax loss in their UEFA submissions for the 2024-25 season.

Combined, this takes Villa’s losses across three years to nearly £290m.

WHAT DO VILLA’S END-OF-YEAR ACCOUNTS TELL US?
Well, there are two accounts to assess. UEFA’s latest report highlights an adjustment they made for an estimated €113m “non-recurring profit on sale of assets”. This included Villa’s sale of their women’s team and The Warehouse — a new multi-use venue next to Villa Park that aims to be fully operational this season.

Those sales, however, were instrumental in Villa subsequently posting a £17m post-tax profit in its own end of year accounts for the 2024-25 season. This is a huge improvement on the £85.4m lost in the prior year, but there is mitigation. Whereas UEFA ignores the sales of the women’s team and The Warehouse — hence the £82m pre-tax loss — it was factored into the end-of-year accounts.

A club statement read: “In June 2025, NSWE Sports Limited disposed of its investment in both (1) Aston Villa Women’s Football Club Limited, and (2) a subsidiary holding the operating rights to The Warehouse property to NSWE Holding Limited, a subsidiary of NSWE UK Limited. Both businesses were repositioned within the wider group structure to facilitate external investment without requiring investors to invest directly in the men’s football team.”

Although Villa’s statement said the end-of-year account results “are consistent with the club’s strategic business plan, and the club continues to operate within the Premier League’s profit and sustainability rules”, their hands are tied, to some extent, across the multiple financial rules.

For example, even though they have made wage savings over the past year and player profits, the latter is only averaged over the past three years, meaning only a third of profits from player sales last summer count towards this year’s SCR calculations. Compounded by no Champions League income in the last six months of 2025, Villa were always going to be fighting against the tide.

When approached by The Athletic last month, official club sources said they were yet to receive confirmation of their breaches from UEFA, though they accepted no Champions League football made Villa vulnerable, particularly having suffered losses the year before despite qualifying for Europe’s blue-chip competition. Last summer saw them cut their cloth accordingly.

Villa had to submit its SCR on October 16 2025, for the 12 months up to December 31 2025, based on data submitted in its preliminary financial information package.

On March 17 2026, Villa had to, in essence, update this information, using now-audited financial statements for the interim period ending in December 2025.

TELL US MORE ABOUT THOSE LOSSES …
Villa’s tussle with financial sanctions is on several fronts.

On the European one, Villa entered into a settlement agreement with UEFA last year, on the back of breaching FER in the three-year period ending June 2024. The agreement places limits on future losses and Villa’s ability to register players for UEFA competition.

The latter point meant any new players Villa brought into their “List A” squad for this season’s Europa League needed to represent cost savings compared with those they replaced. That restriction was a conditional one for next season; if Villa’s football earnings result was positive in 2024-25, it would be lifted. As we now know, they lost €82m for UEFA purposes, so it appears the “List A” restriction will continue into 2026-27.

While SCR has grabbed most of the headlines, FER breaches are generally more serious. Or rather, a breach of the settlement agreement that stems from them is. If clubs breach that, UEFA can tear it up and impose a one-year ban from European competition.

Most positively for Villa, their settlement agreement makes no reference of extra punishment for another breach of SCR, a rule they have continually struggled with; breaching FER would have been far more of a risk. To that end, if they are in breach of SCR again, they can expect another fine on top of those already agreed.

However, Villa’s settlement agreement means they are instead limited to a €5m football-earnings loss in the current season — a target that on its own looks difficult, given the club has no Champions League revenues to rely on while still bearing high operating costs. The agreement does allow that limit to be lifted to a maximum of €60m (£52m) if  Villa’s owners provide equity funding, as they regularly do. Yet even that higher limit might prove difficult given the revenue slump and the size of last season’s underlying loss.

The 2024-25 result gets little mention in the agreement, but remains relevant. If Villa play in European competition in 2027-28, they will be assessed on three years of losses: 2024 to 2027.

In some ways, Villa are a victim of their own success. This season was Villa’s third in a row playing at European level, meaning they have had to adhere to SCR and FER, complicating how they navigate various financial sanctions.

HOW MUCH DID VILLA LOSE OUT ON AFTER FAILING TO QUALIFY FOR THE CHAMPIONS LEAGUE LAST SEASON?
Since the pandemic, Villa have enjoyed the highest revenue growth of any Premier League side (38.42 per cent), with manager Unai Emery largely responsible given the success he has inspired. According to the end-of-season accounts, the club acknowledged the Champions League was fundamental in achieving a revenue increase of 37 per cent (£378.1m) from the previous year (£275.7m).

Unequivocally, the manager is the club’s key revenue driver.

Villa’s fourth-place finish in the 2023-24 season, for example, generated £162.4m in Premier League prize money, while reaching the quarter-finals of the Champions League in 2024-25 amassed more than £70m. This ensured Villa topped £300m in income for the first time and were included in the Deloitte Football Money League top 20.

This, however, came with a word of warning from senior sources.

Their inclusion was significantly boosted by Champions League broadcast revenues, so going without that this season inevitably meant a drop. While revenues are increasing, Villa Park’s limited capacity requires stadium redevelopment for long-term growth. Redevelopment of the North Stand is to take place this summer, initially expanding the capacity by 5,926 additional seats, before plans to increase further.

Within the top 20, four clubs — Villa (overall £378m revenue), West Ham United, Benfica, and Inter — relied on broadcast income for more than 50 per cent of their 2024-25 revenue. In Villa’s case, television money accounted for 63.7 per cent of total revenues, so a sizeable fall can be expected in 2025-26 when there will be no repeat of last season’s run to the Champions League quarter-finals. The Europa League is far less lucrative.

Villa are more susceptible to a big revenue drop-off if on-pitch performances diminish and/or they miss out on the Champions League football but still wind up in other European competitions, still having to tussle with SCR and FER.

HOW ARE VILLA OFFSETTING OUTGOING COSTS?
According to figures from the Deloitte Money League, Villa spent £268m on all staff wages, which equated to 71 per cent of overall revenue. This, though, was when Villa were in the Champions League.

Within the UEFA report, Villa’s operating expenditure costs showed a significant increase. Alongside Barcelona, Chelsea and Arsenal, Villa added more than €50m to operating costs.

Reasons for this include team hotel stays, coach travel and charter flights — such as from Birmingham to the United States for pre-season or for the mid-season trip to Dubai last year — which can run up to hundreds of thousands of pounds at a time. Costs for internal flights to domestic away fixtures exceed more than six figures. Pre-season tours can also cost more than £1m to run.

In turn, the pressure on Villa’s commercial and revenue employees to offset losses or levels of expenditure continues to grow. Aided by becoming a Champions League side, meaning the club could incorporate ‘kickers’ in sponsorship agreements — unlocking an additional amount of money for qualification — sponsorship revenues increased by 31 per cent in the end-of-year accounts (£28.6m) and other commercial revenues by 69 per cent to £70m.

Villa are still trying to find sponsors, but it has been difficult. The topic of stadium naming rights was first put on the table two years ago, yet nothing has materialised. Villa will have to find a new front-of-shirt sponsor at the end of the season, with Premier League clubs required to remove betting sponsors in time for the 2026-27 campaign.

In January, Villa announced a training kit sponsor, Egyptian hotel chain El Gouna Red Sea. It is owned by Samih Sawiris, brother of Villa co-owner Nassef Sawiris.

Villa’s final-day loss at Old Trafford last season meant they missed out on retaining Champions League football on goal difference, and the margin of failure stood in stark contrast to the financial repercussions.

WHAT COULD MISSING OUT ON CHAMPIONS LEAGUE FOOTBALL IN 2025-26 MEAN?
Club sources say missing out on the Champions League last season caused a £70m deficit. This had to be made up in other ways, yet there remains a marked difference between Champions League and Europa League participation. Receiving £70m for reaching the Champions League quarter-finals last season will dwarf what they can make if they win the Europa League in May, which is around £36m.

A return to the Champions League would therefore provide a big boost and, while it’s impossible to project earnings at this stage, Villa would be in line to receive a higher minimum amount from the competition than last season. UEFA’s distribution method is weighted in part by a club’s coefficient ranking, which is driven by past performance in continental competition. Villa’s repeated European campaigns mean their coefficient figure is improving.

UEFA’s desire to control clubs’ spending on players is commendable, but the combination of a huge disparity in distributions across its competitions and a lack of flexibility in their SCR has, unwittingly or otherwise, created a cliff-edge that Villa fell off last year.

That makes it incredibly difficult for clubs like Villa to plan and compete reliably. One loss at Manchester United effectively wiped at least £35m off their income. Wages and player amortisation costs — which also count towards SCR — do not drop nearly so easily. The result is another struggle to comply.

Missing out on Champions League football is hardly great for the ‘Big Six’ either, but there is a crucial difference between them and the rest, Villa included.

WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR FUTURE RECRUITMENT?
In Emery’s tenure, Villa’s recruitment has been underpinned by short-term thinking.

January 2025 saw the arrival of three loan players, with Villa taking on substantial costs for six months, despite knowing they would not have possible resale value or tangible assets by the end of it. Villa’s approach is often transient, with the manager-led structure grappling with the need to alleviate financial pressures.

Marcus Rashford was borrowed from Manchester United, with Villa covering 80 per cent of his £325,000-a-week salary. They also provided full coverage of Marco Asensio’s six-figure wage and also took on Axel Disasi’s, plus a £5million loan fee.

Despite that loan trio departing in the summer, reducing SCR, Villa then took on Jadon Sancho at £160,000 a week, plus Harvey Elliott’s full salary — a deal that was supposed to be an obligation, but Villa did not and do not want to trigger a permanent agreement. Victor Lindelof, meanwhile, was a free agent, though Villa offered a financial package that trumped Everton.

This January, Villa began paying Douglas Luiz’s full salary as well as Tammy Abraham’s permanently, who made considerable financial sacrifices, in the many millions, to finalise the move. Villa have coughed up the second most of any Premier League side (£38.44m) in agent fees for the current season, with these payments being linked to their loan signings and several new contracts that were given out.

Villa’s summer-window strategy is heavily contingent on Champions League qualification. Preliminary contract talks with players are put on hold until the club learn their fate, where plans over those players’ futures may change.

Regardless, Villa are preparing for interest in their biggest asset, Morgan Rogers, who has several Premier League admirers, including Chelsea, as well as suitors in Europe. His sale is the most obvious and straightforward way of alleviating some of the financial pressures, despite posting a post-tax profit in the end of year accounts.

Selling the women’s team and The Warehouse is not exactly sustainable; you cannot do it again. Villa’s reliance on Champions League football is well-known, yet even with the blue-chip competition, they are still tussling with limitations.

Agents speak of Villa’s challenging situation with financial restrictions, with the club sharing little room to manoeuvre. The increasing likelihood, shown in the £5m limit they have with FER, is that Villa will have to be open to player sales, irrespective of Champions League qualification.

Who and how many they sell, however, will be dependent on securing a top four/five finish. The continual wrestling with spreadsheets and financial rules is indicative of the direction modern football continues to head.


Wes and Naseef have just injected £47m into the club through additional shares.

[LeeB]

Apparently our FER limit is €5m but can be increased to €60m with equity.

Which if I am understanding correctly (and that is a doubt) we would need to generate €66m in sales to get to the €60m threshold of permissible losses or €210m in sales to get to €5m, as your sales are only counted in thirds I believe.

We should just rip the fucking shit out these ****** and sue them into oblivion. Fucking unfair cartel bollocks is anti-EU law.

This is the FER business I mentioned yesterday. We have to put the equity in or sell absolutely everybody to comply given we have an £82m loss and only 33% of a sale counts.

Plus I don't think our non-A Squad sales count. Its an utterly catastrophic set of nonsense designed to keep Franco's mob and all their European cronies where they are, less another upstart like PSG or Man City crash the party.

Absolutely what it is.